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DIGGING DEEP: THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S 
APPLICABILITY TO GROUNDWATER 
DISCHARGES 
Abstract: In its 2018 decision, Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Part-
ners, L.P., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found liabil-
ity under the Clear Water Act (“CWA”) for point source pollutant discharges 
that travel through hydrologically connected groundwater on their way to a nav-
igable waterway. This decision aligned the court with precedent from the United 
States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits, but later decisions 
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit resulted in a clear 
circuit split on the issue of CWA applicability to discharges that travel through 
groundwater. The Fourth Circuit also split from several other circuits in its sub-
sidiary finding that liability could be found where there is a continued migration 
of pollution despite the point source itself ceasing to pollute. This Comment ar-
gues that the Fourth Circuit’s decision adhered to the CWA’s intentionally broad 
purpose and will improve the ability of citizen groups and government entities 
to hold polluters accountable. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) has achieved tremendous success in re-
ducing water pollution and improving water quality.1 Through its require-
ment that polluters obtain discharge permits and its comprehensive penalty 
regime for permit violators, the law has played a substantial role in the res-
toration and preservation of the nation’s waters.2 Key to the CWA’s success 
in holding polluters accountable is its citizen-suit provision, which enables 
citizens or citizen groups to initiate legal action against parties alleged to be 
                                                                                                                           
 1 William L. Andreen, Success and Backlash: The Remarkable (Continuing) Story of the Clean 
Water Act, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 25, 26 (2013) (concluding that discharges from 
municipal and industrial polluters have significantly decreased and that water quality has seen im-
provement nationwide). Findings of improved water quality and decreased pollution are based on 
empirical studies put together for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). See EPA, PROGRESS IN 
WATER QUALITY: AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL INVESTMENT IN MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER 
TREATMENT 2-72, at 4–10 (2000), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=20009NCX.TXT 
[https://perma.cc/N2GU-GJ74] (finding a significant decrease in discharges of harmful organic 
pollutants from municipal wastewater treatment plants, despite those treatment plants serving an 
increasing population). 
 2 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2012). See EPA, PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY, supra note 1, at 4–10 (finding that the Clean 
Water Act resulted in a significant reduction in the discharge of contaminants and improvements 
in the overall water quality of the studied waterways); Andreen, supra note 1, at 29 (determining 
that the EPA study “presented unambiguous evidence that the [CWA]’s approach to point source 
regulation was environmentally effective”). 
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in violation of the law’s requirements.3 The law and its citizen-suit provi-
sion have, however, sustained substantial challenges to their scope.4 Specif-
ically, industry representatives have argued for a narrow interpretation of 
statutory violations and have sought to exclude groundwater discharges 
from the CWA’s scope.5 
This Comment explores the CWA’s applicability to the unplanned dis-
charge of petroleum from a pipeline through the soil and groundwater and 
into a navigable waterway in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy 
Partners, L.P. (Upstate Forever II).6 On April 12, 2018, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a pipeline does not need to 
continue to discharge pollutants for an ongoing CWA violation to be found.7 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision also aligned with the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits in finding CWA applicability to 
                                                                                                                           
 3 33 U.S.C. § 1365; see Mark A. Ryan, Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: What the Numbers Tell 
Us, 32 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 20, 22 (2017) (noting the large quantity of citizen-initiated CWA suits 
and their frequent success); Kristi M. Smith, Who’s Suing Whom: A Comparison of Government 
and Citizen Suit Environmental Enforcement Actions Brought Under EPA-Administered Statutes, 
1995–2000, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 399 (2004) (determining that eighty-eight percent of all 
citizen-initiated environmental prosecutions were for CWA violations). 
 4 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (involving a challenge to the 
CWA’s definition of “navigable waters,” in which a plurality found the CWA inapplicable to non-
permanent water bodies); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171–
72 (2001) (excluding isolated and seasonal ponds from the CWA’s definition of “navigable wa-
ters”); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1987) 
(challenging the definition of “violation” in CWA citizen-suits and holding that citizens must 
allege an ongoing violation rather than a wholly past one); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 187–88 (2000) (permitting citizen groups to seek 
civil penalties and achieve standing in CWA actions where the defendant ceases the violation-
causing conduct after the complaint’s filing). 
 5 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 55 (summarizing arguments from industry representatives seek-
ing to limit CWA application to point sources actively discharging at time complaint was filed); 
Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 744–46 (9th Cir. 2018) (summarizing the 
defendant’s argument that the CWA should be limited to point sources that directly convey pollu-
tants into navigable waters), cert. granted, No. 18-260, 2019 WL 659786 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019). 
The petitioner in Gwaltney argued that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, as no violation 
had been recorded in the weeks immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. 484 U.S. at 55. 
The court adopted this approach, finding that the citizen-suit provision does not pertain to “wholly 
past violations.” Id. at 58. 
 6 See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (Upstate Forever II), 887 F.3d 
637, 646 (4th Cir. 2018) (framing the issue as to whether CWA liability could be found for the 
“indirect discharge of a pollutant through groundwater, which has a direct hydrological connection 
to navigable waters”). 
 7 Id. at 648. Reviewing the CWA’s language and that of the similar Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976, the court concluded that an addition of discharged materials to naviga-
ble waters was sufficient to find a CWA violation. Id.; see Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2012). The defendant need not be concurrently engaged in 
the violation-causing conduct. Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 648. 
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pollutant discharges that do not immediately enter navigable waters from a 
point source.8 
This Comment considers the implications of Upstate Forever II, includ-
ing its potential impact on industrial operators, citizen groups seeking to hold 
industry accountable, and regulatory authorities tasked with enforcing the 
CWA.9 Part I of this Comment examines the CWA’s framework and the fac-
tual and procedural background of Upstate Forever II.10 Part II of this Com-
ment discusses the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning and its analysis of precedent 
from its sister circuits.11 Finally, Part III of this Comment argues that the 
Fourth Circuit was correct in its holding, but that its broadened view of CWA 
applicability has resulted in a circuit split and uncertainty that could have 
deep ramifications for industry officials, environmentalists, and regulators 
alike.12 
I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S  
UPSTATE FOREVER DECISION: AN OVERVIEW 
Since the 1972 enactment of the CWA, private individuals and citizen 
groups have been entitled to act as “private attorneys general,” stepping into 
the government’s stead to initiate legal action against alleged polluters.13 
Using the CWA’s citizen-suit provision, two such citizen groups, Upstate 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 651; see Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 747 (finding a 
CWA violation for discharges from wastewater wells that indirectly seeped into the Pacific Ocean 
through groundwater); Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 510–11 (2d Cir. 2005) (find-
ing that the CWA regulated runoff from a concentrated animal-feeding operation, even though the 
pollution passed through farm fields before reaching a navigable waterway). The CWA defines a 
“point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,” and lists examples of such 
sources, including “any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(14). 
 9 See infra notes 13–108 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–48 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 49–78 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 79–108 and accompanying text. 
 13 33 U.S.C. § 1365; see Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 
61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 190 (1998) (describing citizen-plaintiffs and public interest groups 
that file lawsuits under the various environmental statutes as “private attorney[s] general”). The 
phrase “private attorney general” appears to have been first used in a Supreme Court opinion in 
1943, but only became more commonplace in the 1970s. Id. at 179; see FCC v. NBC, 319 U.S. 
239, 265 n.1 (1943) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that people representing the public interest 
rather than an individual’s substantive rights had been described as a “private attorney general” in 
a Second Circuit opinion); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—
and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2130 (2004) (noting that the phrase, which is now 
used almost daily in judicial opinions and scholarly works, has no clear definition). Section 505 of 
the CWA defines a “citizen” as a person or persons. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). The term “person” is 
further defined to include corporations, partnerships, associations and is not limited to individuals. 
Id. § 1362(5). 
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Forever and Savannah Riverkeeper, initiated the Upstate Forever v. Kinder 
Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (Upstate Forever I) litigation in an attempt to 
hold Kinder Morgan responsible for a pipeline spill and the resulting con-
tamination of the Savannah River and its estuaries.14 Section A of this Part 
briefly reviews the CWA’s background, its regulatory functions, and its citi-
zen-suit provision, as well as several key statutory definitions.15 Section B 
of this Part reviews the factual background and procedural history of the 
Upstate Forever II litigation, from the filing of the complaint to the petition 
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.16 
A. The Clean Water Act and Its Citizen Suit Provision 
The 1972 enactment of the CWA was the culmination of a decades-
long congressional effort to reduce water pollution and restore the nation’s 
waters to their natural states.17 Although not Congress’s first foray into wa-
ter-quality control, the CWA established the modern structure for regulating 
pollution discharges from municipalities and industries.18 Under the statute, 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (Upstate Forever I), 252 
F. Supp. 3d at 490, vacated, 887 F.3d 637. Upstate Forever is a South Carolina-based environmen-
tal nonprofit, focused on protecting land and water resources. About Upstate Forever, UPSTATE 
FOREVER, https://www.upstateforever.org/about [https://perma.cc/QL3B-9W95]. Savannah River-
keeper, is a Georgia-based environmental advocacy nonprofit focused entirely on protecting the 
Savannah River watershed. About Us, SAVANNAH RIVERKEEPER, https://www.
savannahriverkeeper.org/about-us.html#/ [https://perma.cc/RSY8-TM6Z]. Kinder Morgan is a 
multinational corporation that owns and operates energy infrastructure including pipelines and 
terminals for natural gas and other petroleum products. About Us: Corporate Profile, KINDER 
MORGAN, https://www.kindermorgan.com/about_us [https://perma.cc/85R6-38Q4]. Also included 
in the suit is Plantation Pipe Line Company, Inc., the owner of Plantation Pipeline, which dis-
charged the pollution at issue in the case. Complaint ¶ 4, Upstate Forever I, 252 F. Supp. 3d 488 
(No. 16 Civ. 4003). Plantation Pipe Line Company is owned jointly by Kinder Morgan (51%) and 
Exxon Mobil Corporation (49%). Kinder Morgan Buying Control of Plantation Pipeline, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 1999, at C4. 
 15 See infra notes 17–29 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 30–48 and accompanying text. 
 17 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313–1342; see N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The 
Story Behind How the 1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmen-
tal Reform, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 80, 87 (2013) (discussing congressional dissat-
isfaction with water pollution control efforts of the 1950s and 1960s and a desire to eliminate 
obstacles to improving water quality). Known today as the Clean Water Act, the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 aimed to “restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251. The CWA made it a na-
tional goal to eliminate the discharge of pollutants by 1985 and established an interim goal of 
water quality suitable for fishing and recreation by mid-1983. Id. § 1251(a)(1)–(2). 
 18 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 115; Water Quality Act 
of 1965, Pub. L. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; Water Pollution Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. 84-660; Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1160; see 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251–1387 (authorizing the EPA to implement pollution control permitting programs and to 
establish water quality standards). The CWA marked a significant shift from Congress’s first ma-
jor attempt to control water quality, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 (“FWCPA”) 
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any individual, corporation, or municipality seeking to discharge pollutants 
into a waterway must first obtain a permit through the CWA’s National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”).19 Each NPDES permit 
sets out specific limits on the discharge of various contaminants and re-
quires the permit holder to implement specified pollution-reducing technol-
ogy.20 These permits are only issued for discharges from a “point source” 
such as pipelines or wells.21 Nonpoint sources, like agricultural runoff, do 
not require NPDES permits and are excluded from the CWA’s purview.22 
The permit requirement is further restricted to pollutant discharges into 
“navigable waters,” a statutory term of art defined as “waters of the United 
States.”23 Exceeding a permit’s limitations or discharging without a NPDES 
permit is considered unlawful.24 
The CWA tasks the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) admin-
istrator with the regulatory administration of the statute and the NPDES 
                                                                                                                           
and its pre-1972 amendments. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 
F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that the CWA constituted “a major change” in the 
enforcement of federal water pollution control); CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
CLEAN WATER ACT: A SUMMARY OF LAW 2 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30030.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ZZ9-TV9K]. The original FWCPA placed emphasis on state and local efforts to 
create water quality standards but proved difficult to enforce, as authorities struggled to attribute 
standards violations to particular polluters. COPELAND, supra, at 2. Rather than determine respon-
sibility for pollution after the fact, the CWA limits discharges at the outset, prescribing through 
permits set amounts of pollutants that each industrial or municipal facility can discharge. Id. at 5–
6. 
 19 33 U.S.C. § 1342. A “pollutant” is broadly defined under the CWA as “dredged spoil, solid 
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biologi-
cal materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt 
and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” Id. § 1362. National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits are required for the more than 65,000 
industrial and municipal facilities discharging such materials into the nation’s waters, as well as 
for the more than 150,000 municipal and industrial facilities discharging storm water. COPELAND, 
supra note 18, at 5. 
 20 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311–1314, 1342. The CWA instructed the EPA administrator to expeditious-
ly establish effluent limitations for various pollutants, considering the “best practicable control 
technology” for the pollutant or the “best available technology economically achievable.” Id. 
§ 1311(b)(1)–(2). When the established limitations would still interfere with the CWA’s goal of 
improved water quality, the EPA administrator is authorized to establish stronger limitations to 
ensure such water quality improvement. Id. § 1312(a). 
 21 Id. § 1362(14). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. § 1362(7). Given the opportunity to interpret the term “navigable waters” in Rapanos v. 
United States, the Supreme Court was unable to reach a majority decision. 545 U.S. 715. A plural-
ity of the justices agreed that “navigable waters” refers only to those “permanent, standing or 
continuously flowing bodies of water” and not to “channels through which water flows intermit-
tently or ephemerally.” Id. at 739. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, disagreed with the plurali-
ty’s definition, instead concluding that the waters need only have a “significant nexus” to some 
navigable waterway. Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 24 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The idea that all pollution is unlawful, unless expressly permitted by 
the government, is a key CWA attribute. COPELAND, supra note 18, at 5. 
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program.25 These powers may be delegated to state environmental agencies 
upon application to the EPA.26 Both the EPA and state agencies are author-
ized to enforce the statute’s provisions, and may impose civil or administra-
tive penalties or bring criminal actions against alleged violators.27 The CWA 
also includes a provision for citizen suits, authorizing any citizen or citizen 
group to bring a civil suit against any entity alleged to be in violation of a 
statutory limitation or agency-issued directive on the discharge of pollu-
tants.28 Such suits, over which federal district courts have jurisdiction, are 
intended to fill the void left when the government is unable or unwilling to 
ensure CWA compliance.29 
B. Upstate Forever’s Factual Background and Procedural History 
In December 2014, citizens of Anderson County, South Carolina, came 
across signs of a gasoline spill in an area where an underground pipeline 
                                                                                                                           
 25 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(d), 1342(a). 
 26 Id. § 1342(b). Although the EPA is the designated NPDES administrator, a state may sub-
mit a comprehensive application detailing a plan for a state-administered program. Id. § 1342(b). 
Forty-six states have this delegated authority today. About NPDES, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
npdes/about-npdes [https://perma.cc/WKX5-TT8H]. 
 27 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b)–(d). 
 28 Id. § 1365(a). A citizen may also file suit against the EPA Administrator, alleging that the 
Administrator has failed to perform any non-discretionary act or duty required by the statute. Id. 
§ 1365(a)(2). Prior to commencing a suit, the plaintiff must give 60-days notice to the EPA Ad-
ministrator, the state in which the alleged violation is occurring, and to the alleged violator. Id. 
§ 1365(b)(1). The suit cannot be filed, however, if the EPA Administrator or state agency is ac-
tively prosecuting the alleged violator. Id. Under the CWA’s citizen suit provision, an environ-
mental group may itself have standing to sue, provided that its members have standing to sue on 
their own. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181. 
 29 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); see Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 62 (finding the “central purpose” of the 
citizen suit provision “to abate pollution when the government cannot or will not command com-
pliance”); see also David Allan Feller, Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws 
Through Citizen Suits: A Model, 60 DENV. L.J. 553, 555 (1982) (noting that Congress added a 
citizen suit provision to the CWA in an effort to ensure the act’s enforcement “in the face of offi-
cial inaction”); Leslie K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1, 
21 (2012) (detailing the limited ability of environmental agencies to ensure CWA compliance). 
The provision was intended to encourage the EPA and “corps of private attorneys general” to 
work collaboratively to ensure full enforcement of the statute. Feller, supra at 553–55. This citi-
zen-suit provision of the CWA was modeled off of a similar provision in the Clean Air Act, which 
was extensively debated during that statute’s legislative hearings. Richard E. Schwartz & David P. 
Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry Under the Clean Water Act, 17 NAT. RES. LAW. 
327, 328–31 (1984). The provision has been used frequently and enforcement more often occurs 
through private actions than through federal enforcement litigation. Ryan, supra note 3 at 20. In 
2016, for instance, a citizen was listed as a plaintiff in fifty of seventy-nine reported federal CWA 
decisions, whereas the federal government was only listed as plaintiff on ten occasions. Id. Federal 
district courts have jurisdiction over all such citizen suits, through an express statutory grant. 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
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ran.30 The pipeline, owned by Plantation Pipe Line, a subsidiary of Kinder 
Morgan, had sprung a leak when a patch failed, resulting in the discharge of 
369,000 gallons of petroleum products.31 Kinder Morgan repaired the pipe-
line shortly after learning of the failure.32 The company soon began remedi-
ation efforts under the supervision of the South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control (“DHEC”).33 Within a year of the spill, 
Kinder Morgan and its contractors had removed approximately 209,000 
gallons of the spilled gasoline from the land.34 Although the discharge ini-
tially only contaminated the soil and surrounding groundwater, it was locat-
ed within 1,000 feet of Browns Creek and 400 feet of Cupboard Creek, both 
tributaries of the Savannah River.35 One month later, in January 2015, a 
sheen of petroleum was visible in Browns Creek, and subsequent testing 
revealed that the levels of benzene in the water far exceeded the permissible 
standard under federal regulations.36 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 643. The citizens encountered the smell of gasoline, pud-
dles of a gasoline-like substance, and dead plants. Complaint, Upstate Forever I, supra note 14, 
¶ 5. 
 31 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 643. The amount of discharged material is not in dispute, 
but is referred to interchangeably as gasoline, oil, and petroleum product by the court and parties. 
See id. at 643–44 (referring to the discharged material as gasoline); Upstate Forever I, 252 
F. Supp. 3d at 491 (referring to the discharged material as petroleum product). 
 32 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 644. It is unclear how Kinder Morgan received notice of the 
discharge, but the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant did not itself discover or detect the spill. 
Complaint, Upstate Forever I, supra note 14, ¶ 5. 
 33 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 644. The EPA has delegated NPDES permitting authority to 
South Carolina’s DHEC, and the state agency is now charged with carrying out the administration 
and enforcement of the NPDES program within its borders. NPDES State Program Information: 
State Program Authority, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-information [https://
perma.cc/92R7-DCC5]. South Carolina’s NPDES permit program was authorized on June 10, 1975. 
Id.; see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 629 F.3d 387, 390 (4th Cir. 
2011) (noting that DHEC is the authorized state permit issuer); see also supra note 26 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the CWA’s provision for state delegation). 
 34 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 643. The plaintiffs alleged that Kinder Morgan had recov-
ered “no significant amount” of contaminants since late 2015 and that at least 160,000 gallons 
remained unrecovered. Id.; Brief of Appellant at 2, Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d 637 (No. 17-
1640), 2017 WL 3026327, at *2. 
 35 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 641, 643; Complaint, Upstate Forever I, supra note 14, 
¶ 11. 
 36 Complaint, Upstate Forever I, supra note 14, ¶ 17. That the spilled petroleum products 
eventually entered the creeks is not disputed in the defendants’ filings. See, e.g., Brief of Appel-
lees at 2, Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d 637 (No. 17-1640), 2017 WL 3887952, at *2; Defendants’ 
Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, Upstate Forever I, 252 F. Supp. 3d 488 (No. 16 Civ. 
4003), 2017 WL 3699731, at *6, *11. The defendants acknowledged that the Corrective Action 
Plan they submitted to DHEC included a comprehensive proposal to remove spilled material from 
soil, groundwater, and surface water. Brief of Appellees, Upstate Forever II, supra, at 2. Benzene 
is categorized as “a major public health concern” by the World Health Organization and exposure 
to benzene can have adverse health effects on humans, from headaches and dizziness to an in-
creased risk of cancer. WORLD HEALTH ORG., EXPOSURE TO BENZENE: A MAJOR PUBLIC 
HEALTH CONCERN 1 (2010), http://www.who.int/ipcs/features/benzene.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN5F-
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Concerned that Kinder Morgan continued to fail to comply with ex-
plicit DHEC instructions on pollution testing and cleanup, Upstate Forever 
and Savannah Riverkeeper initiated a citizen suit against the company in 
December 2016.37 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Kinder 
Morgan continued to ignore environmental standards and agency deadlines 
and did not issue an appropriate remediation plan.38 The plaintiffs also al-
leged that DHEC and the EPA failed to adequately address the defendants’ 
violations by declining to force them into compliance through litigation.39 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in February 2017, and 
the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina granted their motion, 
finding that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the CWA was 
inapplicable to the facts.40 The district court determined that the discharge of 
petroleum products constituted nonpoint source pollution—contaminants not 
covered by the CWA—as the ruptured pipeline did not directly discharge into 
“navigable waters.”41 According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to allege a 
                                                                                                                           
TPVJ]. Recognizing the dangers associated with benzene, EPA has promulgated regulations, 
which provide that the maximum contaminant level for benzene in drinking water is 0.005mg/L, 
while the maximum contaminant level goal is zero mg/L. 40 C.F.R. § 141.61 (2018); id. § 141.61 
subpt. Q, app. B. Benzene levels in Browns Creek, however, reached levels of 0.0234 mg/L, more 
than four times the federal standard. Complaint, supra note 14, ¶ 17. 
 37 Upstate Forever I, 252 F. Supp. 3d. at 490. Rather than test the pollution levels near the 
source of the discharge, as instructed by DHEC in March 2016, the defendants took samples on 
the opposite side of the creek, and only began sampling at the appropriate location in August 
2016, after the plaintiffs took their own samples. Complaint, supra note 14, ¶¶ 20–21. Despite the 
defendants’ deployment of oil absorbent booms in the contaminated water bodies, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the devices had been neglected and that defendants failed to replace them when they 
became saturated with petroleum products. Id. ¶ 26. 
 38 Complaint, Upstate Forever I, supra note 14, ¶¶ 35–37. Plantation’s Corrective Action Plan 
was due on March 25, 2016, but was not submitted until September 5, 2016. Id. ¶ 35. The company 
also ignored DHEC’s instructions to submit a Pore Water Sampling Plan, writing that it refused to 
comply with the request a month after the original deadline had passed. Id. The proposed Corrective 
Action Plan was also criticized by environmental groups as containing too long a timeframe for the 
spill cleanup. Mike Eads, KM Plan for Belton Spill Criticized, INDEP. MAIL (Nov. 21 2016), https://
www.independentmail.com/story/news/2016/11/21/km-spill-site-gets-worse-allegedly/94225524 
[https://perma.cc/Y5CV-CJJX]; see R. 2016-048, ANDERSON CTY. COUNCIL (2016), https://www.
southernenvironment.org/uploads/words_docs/Anderson_County_Belton_resolution.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q5Z5-LTMZ] (requesting that DHEC order Kinder Morgan to clean up the released petro-
leum products expeditiously). 
 39 Complaint, Upstate Forever I, supra note 14, ¶ 38. It is a CWA statutory requirement that a 
citizen may not bring an action if a federal or state authority is already pursuing criminal or civil 
charges to remedy the violation. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). 
 40 Upstate Forever I, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 498. The court also dismissed the case pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to state 
a valid CWA claim. Id. 
 41 Id. at 494 (referring to the “migration of pollutants on top of or through soil and ground 
water” as nonpoint source pollution). The court also found that the plume of discharged pollutants 
itself could not be considered a point source, as the defendants did not utilize a “discrete convey-
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continuing violation and merely pointed to the enduring impact of a prior dis-
charge.42 The court also declined to adopt the plaintiffs’ assertions that the 
CWA applied to groundwater “hydrologically connected” to surface water, 
instead finding that the statute’s language pointed to “navigable waters” and 
“ground waters” as separate areas of regulation.43 
The plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal, arguing that the district 
court incorrectly labeled the contaminants as “nonpoint source pollution.”44 
They also requested that the Fourth Circuit vacate the district court’s conclu-
sion that the CWA is inapplicable to groundwater “hydrologically connected” 
to surface water.45 A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision, finding the CWA applicable to the spill from Kinder Mor-
gan’s ruptured pipeline.46 In August 2018, Kinder Morgan filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, challenging both conclusions.47 While 
the petition was pending, the Supreme Court, on February 19, 2019, granted 
certiorari on the issue of discharges that pass through groundwater in the re-
lated Ninth Circuit case, Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui.48 
II. THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had to re-
solve two distinct issues in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Part-
ners, L.P. (Upstate Forever II).49 First, the court examined whether the pipe-
line rupture involved “point source” contamination and constituted an ongo-
ing CWA violation.50 Second, the court considered whether the release of 
pollutants to navigable waters through hydrologically connected groundwa-
ter constitutes a “discharge” under the CWA.51 Section A of this Part re-
                                                                                                                           
ance” or otherwise channel the pollutants through the groundwater to navigable waters. Id. at 494–
96. 
 42 Id. at 494. 
 43 Id. at 497–98. 
 44 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 645. 
 45 Brief of Appellant, Upstate Forever II, supra note 34, at 9, 26; see Upstate Forever I, 252 
F. Supp. 3d at 497–98 (distinguishing “navigable waters” from “ground waters” and determining 
that pollution discharge to groundwaters is outside the scope of the CWA). 
 46 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652–53. Kinder Morgan filed a petition for rehearing and 
rehearing en banc, but the petition was denied. Order, Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d 637 (No. 17-
1640), ECF No. 120. 
 47 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. v. Upstate Forever, No. 
18-268 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-268/60921/2018
0828122328739_Kinder%20Morgan%20Cert%20Petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4XD-33YH]. 
 48 County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, No. 18-260, 2019 WL 659786 (U.S. Feb. 19, 
2019), granting cert. to Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d 737. 
 49 Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (Upstate Forever II), 887 F.3d 
637, 649, 651 (4th Cir. 2018) 
 50 Id. at 649. 
 51 Id. at 651. 
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views the Fourth Circuit’s holding that Kinder Morgan’s pipeline qualifies 
as a “point source” and that there is an ongoing violation even if the point 
source is itself no longer discharging pollutants.52 Section B of this Part dis-
cusses how the court reached its conclusion that the CWA applies to pollutant 
discharges that travel through “hydrologically connected” groundwater.53 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Finding of an Ongoing Discharge Violation 
In reviewing the district court’s finding of no subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the Fourth Circuit considered the Supreme Court’s 1987 ruling in 
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation requiring that a 
CWA violation be ongoing.54 Specifically, the court addressed whether 
Kinder Morgan’s quick repair of the pipeline prohibited the plaintiff envi-
ronmental groups from initiating the litigation.55 The Fourth Circuit began 
its analysis with a review of the CWA’s statutory framework and circuit 
precedent.56 Interpreting the statute’s plain language, the court determined 
that a citizen need only allege that a polluter be in violation of the CWA 
through the ongoing addition of a pollutant to navigable waters; the statute 
does not require that the point source itself also continue to release the pol-
lutant.57 In arriving at this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit looked to its 2015 
decision in Goldfarb v. Mayor of Baltimore, where it emphasized that the 
status of a defendant’s pollution-causing conduct was irrelevant.58 Although 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See infra notes 54–65 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 66–78 and accompanying text. 
 54 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 646–47; see Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake 
Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987) (concluding that the citizen-suit provision of the CWA is 
forward-looking and meant to abate ongoing pollution). The Supreme Court in Gwaltney empha-
sized that citizen suits were intended only to supplement government enforcement actions, and 
that permitting citizen suits for “wholly past” violations would frustrate Congress’s intent in pass-
ing the statute. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. The citizen suit is therefore focused only on “prospec-
tive relief,” including the possibility of an injunction; civil penalties can only be sought in a suit 
that also seeks to enjoin the polluter. Id. at 58–59. 
 55 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 648 (quoting Am. Cone Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, 412 F.3d 
536, 540 (4th Cir. 2005)) (holding that remedial efforts “do not ipso facto establish the absence of 
federal jurisdiction over a citizen suit”). 
 56 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 647–48; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A), 1365 
(2012); Goldfarb v. Mayor of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 513 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 57 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 647–48; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(12)(A) (“The term ‘dis-
charge of a pollutant’ and the term ‘discharge of pollutants’ each means . . . any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source”). The court explained that indirect discharges 
of pollutants to navigable waters could result in a delay between the cessation of the discharge 
from the point source and the commencement of the contamination of the navigable waters, but 
emphasized that the CWA contains no language prohibiting the finding of a violation for citizen-
suit purposes in such a scenario. Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 648. 
 58 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 647; see Goldfarb, 791 F.3d at 513 (concluding that the 
relevant jurisdictional question for a citizen suit was not whether the defendants’ pollution-causing 
conduct had ceased, but whether there was a present and continuing violation of a limitation in a 
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at least some of the defendants’ environment-damaging activities occurred 
in the past, the Goldfarb court concluded that the plaintiffs properly alleged 
an ongoing violation, because the materials continued to migrate away from 
the leakage site.59 The Fourth Circuit therefore concluded in Upstate Forev-
er II that the district court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction was 
inapposite, because the plaintiffs had properly alleged an ongoing violation 
due to the continued migration of spilled gasoline into the waterways.60 
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit reviewed decisions of 
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits, 
which had previously analyzed disputes over the “ongoing violation” re-
quirement.61 In 1993, in Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Reming-
ton Arms Co., the Second Circuit concluded that the prior discharge of lead 
shot from skeet shooting at Remington’s gun club into the Long Island 
Sound did not constitute a continuing CWA violation.62 The Fourth Circuit, 
however, distinguished the case as one involving pollutants that had already 
completely entered the waterway and thus there was no further discharge of 
bullets into the water.63 The Fourth Circuit also analyzed the Fifth Circuit’s 
1985 decision in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., where the 
plaintiffs alleged that a pipeline owned by Diamond Shamrock Chemical 
                                                                                                                           
regulatory permit or standard). While the court’s decision in Goldfarb involved a violation of a 
different statute—the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976—the court in Upstate 
Forever II concluded that the language of the statutes was similar. Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 
647. The court flatly rejected the dissent’s assertion that Goldfarb is unhelpful. Id. at 647 n.6; see 
id. at 662 (Floyd, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority misplaced reliance on Goldfarb because 
that case did not involve a determination of whether a violation was ongoing). 
 59 Goldfarb, 791 F.3d at 512. 
 60 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649. The court also reached the subsidiary conclusion that 
the pipeline “unambiguously qualifies” as the point source at issue. Id. at 647. In determining that 
a violation could be found even after a point source had stopped releasing contaminants, the court 
declined to address the dissent and defendant’s arguments that the groundwater and soil were a 
“nonpoint source,” that therefore rendered the CWA inapplicable. Id. at 647–48; id. at 647 n.7. 
But see id. at 661–62 (Floyd, J., dissenting) (referring to the migration of pollutants through the 
soil and groundwater as nonpoint source pollution); Brief of Appellees, Upstate Forever II, supra 
note 36, at 31–32 (arguing that the discharges “squarely fall within the definition of nonpoint 
source pollution”). 
 61 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 648 (finding an ongoing CWA violation despite a delay 
between the release of the pollutants from a point source and their discharge into a waterway); 
Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(finding no CWA violation despite a bullet that was actively decomposing and releasing pollutants 
into a waterway); Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(finding no CWA violation in the residual effects and continued leaking of previously discharged 
oil into groundwater). 
 62 Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1313. Since Remington persuasively argued 
that their shooting club had ceased operation, the court emphasized that the plaintiff had to pro-
vide evidence that continuing violations would be likely. Id. The court concluded the plaintiffs 
presented no evidence that Remington was likely to make further discharges. Id. 
 63 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649. 
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Co. leaked petroleum into their groundwater and a stream on their proper-
ty.64 The Fourth Circuit qualified the Hamker decision as inapplicable to its 
Upstate Forever II decision, because the plaintiffs in that case did not allege 
any discharge into “navigable waters,” but had merely argued a CWA viola-
tion for a groundwater discharge.65 
B. The Clean Water Act’s (Limited) Applicability to Groundwater 
After concluding that the plaintiffs had successfully alleged an “ongo-
ing violation” of the CWA, the Fourth Circuit examined the CWA’s broader 
applicability to the discharge of contaminants that do not directly enter sur-
face waters from a point source.66 Specifically, the court addressed the 
plaintiffs’ contention that a CWA violation could be found when contami-
nants are discharged into groundwater, but make their way into navigable 
waters through a “direct hydrological connection.”67 The court began its 
analysis with a review of the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Rapanos v. 
United States, in which the Court determined that wetlands and seasonal 
streams fell outside the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters.”68 The 
Fourth Circuit followed the reasoning of Justice Antonin Scalia’s plurality 
opinion in Rapanos in determining that the CWA forbids only the addition 
of pollutants to navigable waters, but contains no language on whether that 
addition needs to be “direct” from the point source.69 Reviewing the stat-
ute’s language, the Fourth Circuit determined that a discharge must only 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id.; Hamker, 756 F.2d at 394. The Hamkers sought an injunction and civil penalties, argu-
ing that the defendants’ cleanup efforts were deficient and that they suffered lasting damage to 
their ability to water their livestock. Id. 
 65 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649; see Hamker, 756 F.2d at 397 (holding that the post-
spill seepage of oil into groundwater and grasslands did not result in a CWA violation). The 
Fourth Circuit also noted that the pollutants in the Hamker suit were not entering a navigable wa-
terway, but that the complaint only alleged they were “leaking into ground water” and “grass-
lands.” Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649. The Hamker decision, however, contained language 
contradicting the Upstate Forever II decision, as it found that the continuing seepage of previously 
discharged oil was not actively coming from a point source. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 397. The Fourth 
Circuit, however, acknowledged that such a position would contradict its earlier Goldfarb deci-
sion, and declined to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning. Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649 & 
n.9; see supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Goldfarb’s holding. 
 66 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d. at 649. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 649–50; see Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 734 (2006) (limiting the defini-
tion of “navigable waters” and finding that the term pertains only to permanent water bodies). 
 69 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649–50; see Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (noting that the 
CWA simply forbids the “addition of any pollutant to navigable waters” and contains no language 
on directness of the discharge). 
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come “from” a point source, and that the point source need not itself direct-
ly feed into the navigable waters.70 
The Fourth Circuit observed that other circuits had dismissed the con-
tention that a discharge from a point source must directly enter the navigable 
waters.71 In 2018, in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, the Ninth Cir-
cuit examined whether the discharge of sewage from wastewater holding 
wells through the groundwater and into the Pacific Ocean constituted a CWA 
violation.72 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the indirect discharge could in-
deed constitute such a statutory violation because the pollution came from a 
defined point source.73 Adopting this reasoning in its Upstate Forever II deci-
sion, the Fourth Circuit determined that Kinder Morgan could be found to 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 650 (determining that the CWA relies upon the word 
“from” to refer to the “starting point” or “cause” of the discharge, but that it contains no require-
ment that the discharge directly enter the navigable waterway); see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) 
(“The term ‘discharge of a pollutant’ . . . means any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters 
from any point source . . . .”). The court added that an opposite finding would require that pollu-
tants be “seamlessly channeled,” a contention that would conflict with findings by sister circuits. 
Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 650; see Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 
747 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding a CWA violation when wastewater seeped from an injection well and 
into the Pacific Ocean through groundwater), cert. granted, No. 18-260, 2019 WL 659786 (U.S. 
Feb. 19, 2019); Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the 
CWA applicable to runoff from a concentrated animal feeding operation, even though the pollu-
tion passed through farm fields before reaching a navigable waterway); Concerned Area Residents 
for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a CWA violation 
could be found when liquid manure passed through farm fields and into navigable waters). 
 71 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 650; see Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 747 (finding that 
wastewater that seeped from a well into the Pacific Ocean but that did not go through a “confined 
and discrete conveyance” could nevertheless result in a CWA violation); Waterkeeper Alliance, 
Inc., 399 F.3d at 510–11 (finding the discharge of manure applied to land from a concentrated 
animal feeding operation did not have to be “collected” or “channelized” into a navigable water-
way for a CWA violation to be found); Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 119 (finding that manure, 
which passed through farm fields after being discharged from tankers, could result in a CWA 
violation if it reached navigable waters). 
 72 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 746–47. As in Upstate Forever II, the fact that pollutants 
reached “navigable waters” was not in dispute. Id. at 742; see Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 641 
(noting it was undisputed that gasoline had seeped into the Savannah River watershed). The de-
fendants in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, however, contended that the pollution must reach the water 
though a “confined, discrete conveyance” and that an indirect discharge to the Pacific Ocean did 
not require a NPDES permit. 886 F.3d at 745–46. 
 73 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 749. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the injection wells 
were similar to a storm water drain system in that they “confined” and “contained” the pollutants 
before the pollutants made their way to “navigable waters.” Id. at 746. The courts have repeatedly 
emphasized that a pollutant must at some point be purposefully collected or channeled in order for 
an activity to qualify as a point source. See Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 
1143, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a storm drain involves the collection or channel-
ization of pollutants, therefore qualifying as a point source, and that an unpermitted release from 
the drain that travels through groundwater before reaching a navigable water would constitute a 
CWA violation); see also Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1990) (find-
ing that sediment collected in human-created basins and that discharged into navigable waters 
through the flow of gravity could constitute a CWA violation). 
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have violated the CWA, even though its discharged contaminant traversed 
some medium between the point source and the navigable waterway.74 
Despite finding a potential CWA violation from indirect discharges, the 
Fourth Circuit cautioned that there must be a sufficient connection between 
the discharge from the point source and the navigable waters.75 Relying on 
the EPA’s own interpretation of its authority under the CWA, the court iden-
tified several factors for determining if a “direct hydrological connection” 
exists, including the distance the pollutants must travel and the traceability 
of the pollutants back to the point source.76 A further factor is the absence 
of other alternative or contributing causes.77 The Fourth Circuit ultimately 
concluded that the gasoline pollutants in the creeks only needed to travel a 
short distance from the pipeline, were directly traceable to the pipeline, and 
had no other potential cause.78 
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED PRECEDENT, BUT THE 
LEGAL LANDSCAPE REMAINS UNCERTAIN 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (Upstate Forever 
II) is a significant contribution to the ongoing discussion on the reach of the 
CWA.79 Adhering to the statute’s intentionally broad scope, the court cor-
                                                                                                                           
 74 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 651. 
 75 Id. The court emphasized that there should be a “clear connection” in instances involving a 
discharge that travels through groundwater. Id. 
 76 Id. (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 
2960, 3015 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122 & 412) [hereinafter CAFO Stand-
ards]). In multiple rule promulgations, the EPA has adopted the position that the CWA is applica-
ble to pollution discharges that travel through groundwater hydrologically connected to some 
surface water. CAFO Standards, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3015. The Ninth Circuit in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund 
also emphasized that the connection must be sufficiently traceability. 886 F.3d at 749. The Ninth 
Circuit expressly rejected a lower court’s contention that the way in which pollutants reach navi-
gable water is immaterial for CWA liability. Id. Instead, the court found it particularly important 
that pollutants be traceable back to the point source; the conclusive results of a tracer dye study 
were therefore sufficient to render CWA liability. Id. 
 77 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652. 
 78 Id. The court noted that Kinder Morgan did not contend that there was another cause, so 
that fact was undisputed. Id. 
 79 See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. (Upstate Forever II), 887 F.3d 
637, 652–53 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding an unplanned discharge of petroleum that passes through 
groundwater and soil before entering a river sufficient to make the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) 
jurisdictional). A debate over the CWA’s reach is playing out within the federal government, and 
the EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 2015 issued a rule to clarify the CWA’s definition 
of “waters of the United States” and to better ensure CWA predictability and applicability, known 
as the “WOTUS Rule.” Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. 
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and in scattered parts of 40 
C.F.R.). Shortly after entering office, however, President Trump issued an Executive Order to 
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rectly resolved two critical jurisdictional issues involving the CWA.80 First, 
the court accurately interpreted the statute’s language and properly applied 
its own circuit precedent in finding a present and ongoing CWA violation.81 
Next, on an issue of first impression for the Fourth Circuit, the court appro-
priately rooted its finding of liability for pollution discharges that travel 
through groundwater in the statute’s language and precedent from its sister 
circuits.82 The court’s resolution of both issues has resulted in a circuit split, 
which may cause uncertainty for polluters and environmentalists alike.83 An 
                                                                                                                           
review the WOTUS Rule and the EPA issued a notice to revise the rule. Restoring the Rule of 
Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the “Waters of the United States” Rule, 82 
Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017); Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of 
Pre-Existing Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,899 (July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and in 
scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). In December 2018, the Trump administration re-issued a proposed 
rule. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154 (Feb. 14, 2019) (to 
be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). The proposed rule would 
reduce the CWA’s scope by eliminating its applicability to seasonal streams and wetlands not 
adjacent to statutorily protected water bodies. Coral Davenport, Trump Plan Would Weaken Rules 
Protecting Wetlands from Pollutants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2018, at A17. The Obama-era rule has 
also been subject to significant litigation, including several enjoinment attempts. See S.C. Coastal 
Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969–70 (D.S.C. 2018) (enjoining nationwide 
the Trump Administration’s attempt to suspend the Obama-era WOTUS Rule); Texas v. EPA, No. 
15-cv-0162, 2018 WL 4518230, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2018) (temporarily enjoining the 
WOTUS rule in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi). 
 80 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649, 651 (holding first that a point source need not 
continue to discharge for a CWA violation to be ongoing and holding second that the CWA ap-
plies to pollution discharges, even if they travel through hydrologically connected groundwater on 
their way to a navigable waterway); H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131 (1972) (“The Committee fully 
intends the term ‘navigable waters’ to be given the broadest possible constitutional interpreta-
tion.”). 
 81 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2012) (broadly defining the term “discharge of a pollutant); 
Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 647–48 (determining that the statute’s language is focused on the 
“addition” of pollutants to navigable waters and that the point source need not itself continue to 
actively release the pollutants); Goldfarb v. Mayor of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 513 (4th Cir. 
2015) (finding that the relevant question in determining liability is whether the violation is ongo-
ing, not whether the conduct that caused the violation continues). 
 82 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (indicating that a pollution discharge must come “from” a 
point source but containing no language requiring that the point source feed directly into navigable 
waters; Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 650 (finding that a point source needs to be the “starting 
point or cause of a discharge” but that it doesn’t have to directly convey the pollutants to naviga-
ble waters); Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 747, 749 (9th Cir. 2018) (find-
ing a CWA violation when municipal wastewater migrated from injection wells, through ground-
water, to the Pacific Ocean), cert. granted, No. 18-260, 2019 WL 659786 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019); 
Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that a CWA violation could be found when liquid manure passed through fields into 
navigable waters). 
 83 Compare Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649 (holding that an ongoing violation could be 
found even when the point source itself is no longer discharging pollutants, so long as the pollu-
tants continue to enter the navigable water), with Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington 
Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1312–13 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the continuing decomposition of a 
lead bullet in navigable waterways did not constitute an ongoing CWA violation). The courts also 
split on the issue of whether a CWA violation may be found when a discharge passes through 
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opposite conclusion—one which would require a point source to discharge 
directly into a navigable water—would frustrate the CWA’s purpose and 
broad public policy goals by creating a significant loophole for polluters.84 
This would enable polluters to avoid permit requirements and liability by 
simply discharging pollutants into the ground, regardless of how close the 
discharge is to navigable waters.85 
The Fourth Circuit in Upstate Forever II correctly found that the plain-
tiffs alleged sufficient facts to establish an ongoing CWA violation.86 Re-
viewing the statute’s plain language, the court properly determined that 
CWA violations are caused not by the release of pollutants but by their “ad-
dition” to navigable waters.87 The court accurately noted that the CWA con-
tains no temporal limitations on the travel of a pollutant from a point source 
to a navigable waterway; even if the point source has been repaired, a viola-
tion may be found if the pollutants eventually make their way to a navigable 
waterway.88 
                                                                                                                           
groundwater. Compare Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652–53 (finding a CWA violation for an 
unplanned pollutant discharge that reaches navigable water by way of hydrologically connected 
groundwater), and Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 747, 749 (finding a CWA violation when 
municipal wastewater migrated from injection wells, through groundwater, to the Pacific Ocean), 
with Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 931, 933 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding the 
CWA inapplicable to a coal ash discharge that traveled from a holding pond, through groundwa-
ter, into a nearby lake), and Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 447 
(6th Cir. 2018) (finding the CWA inapplicable to coal ash discharges that traveled from a holding 
pond to a nearby river by way of groundwater). Though the Fourth Circuit in a post-Upstate For-
ever II case purported to adopt the position that discharges to hydrologically connected groundwa-
ter are covered by the CWA, it nonetheless rejected a finding of CWA liability for coal ash dis-
charges that made their way to navigable waters through groundwater. Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & 
Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 410 (4th Cir. 2018). The court focused here not on the issue of ground-
water contamination, but on the definition of “point source,” finding coal ash ponds to not be 
sufficiently discernible conveyances within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 411.  
 84 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652 (noting that a conclusion of no liability for indirect 
discharges would frustrate the CWA’s purpose); Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 941 (Clay, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing concern that the Sixth Circuit’s finding of no 
liability for indirect discharges will open a large and unintended loophole). 
 85 Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652. 
 86 See Id. at 649 (concluding that the plaintiffs properly alleged a continuing addition of pollu-
tants to a navigable water, thereby meeting the sufficiency requirements for an ongoing violation 
claim). 
 87 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (“[T]he term ‘discharge of a pollutant’ . . . means . . . any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”); Upstate Forever II, 887 
F.3d at 648 (determining that an ongoing discharge should be found if there is an ongoing addition 
to a navigable waterway). 
 88 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 648 (concluding that the repair of the pipeline does not 
absolve the polluter of CWA liability). The court pointed out that the CWA’s definition of a pollu-
tant discharge contains no language prohibiting a delay in the material traveling from the point 
source to the receiving waterbody. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (defining “discharge of a 
pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source” and mak-
ing no reference to time). 
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Although this finding is properly grounded in Fourth Circuit prece-
dent, the court’s attempt to avoid a circuit split by distinguishing several 
decisions from its sister circuits on factual differences is unconvincing and 
weakens its analysis.89 In 1985, in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical 
Co., which also involved a point source that had ceased discharging oil, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that residual ef-
fects from the prior discharge are insufficient to state a claim under the 
CWA—a decision that directly contradicts the Fourth Circuit’s Upstate For-
ever II holding on the ongoing discharge issue.90 The Fourth Circuit first 
argued that Hamker did not involve a similar factual issue, but in a footnote 
acknowledged the unsettling proposition that the Hamker decision may con-
travene the court’s other precedent and thus declined to follow its reason-
ing.91 
The court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs had alleged an ongoing viola-
tion is nevertheless firmly rooted in Supreme Court precedent.92 As the 
Court emphasized in 1987 in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation, Inc., the purpose of including a citizen suit provision in the 
CWA was to abate or enjoin present and ongoing pollution.93 Abatement of 
pollution and injunctive relief remains a clear possibility in the alleged cir-
                                                                                                                           
 89 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649 (rejecting decisions from other circuits finding no 
discharge when point source ceased releasing pollutants); Goldfarb, 791 F.3d at 513 (finding that 
the defendant need not be actively engaged in the violation-causing activity for a violation to be 
found). But see Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1312–13 (finding no liability when 
the defendant was no longer engaged in the violation-causing activity of discharging bullets into a 
waterway); Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding 
no liability from a past discharge of a pipeline). 
 90 Compare Hamker, 756 F.2d at 397 (finding that the “continuing seepage into groundwater 
of the now-dispersed leaked oil” could not constitute a CWA violation, as it was not coming 
“from” a point source), with Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 650 (finding an ongoing violation 
because the pollutants came “from” a point source at some earlier time; it did not matter that the 
point source was not continuing to release pollutants into the environment). 
 91 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 649 n.9 (acknowledging the potential conflict between 
the Fifth Circuit’s Hamker decision and the Fourth Circuit’s Goldfarb decision). The Fourth Cir-
cuit also attempted to distinguish the Second Circuit’s Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n 
case on the ground that it involved a pollutant (lead shot) that had already been added to a naviga-
ble waterway. Id. at 649; see Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1310, 1313. The bul-
let, however, was continuing to decompose and there is therefore merit to the argument that a 
pollutant was actively being added to the waters, an argument that contradicts the Fourth Circuit’s 
attempt at differentiation. See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1313 (finding that the 
CWA’s present violation requirement would be undermined if the decomposition of previously 
deposited pollutants was to be included in its definition). 
 92 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987) 
(finding that the “prospective relief” authorized by the citizen-suit provision of the CWA is only 
achievable when there is present or future harm that can be remedied); Upstate Forever II, 887 
F.3d at 648 (finding an ongoing CWA violation). 
 93 See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61 (finding support in the legislative history of the CWA for the 
idea that the citizen-suit provision exists for abatement purposes). 
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cumstances—pollutants continue to reach the Savannah River watershed—
therefore making Kinder Morgan’s violation appropriate for citizen en-
forcement.94 
The Fourth Circuit’s finding in Upstate Forever II that a discharge that 
passes through groundwater may still result in a CWA violation is also firmly 
rooted in statutory language and precedent from other circuits.95 The court 
correctly noted that the CWA only requires that pollution comes “from” a 
point source and contains no language on whether that point source must di-
rectly feed into the navigable waterway.96 The court’s finding that the pollu-
tion does not need to be directly added from the point source to the body of 
water is also supported by the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Rapanos v. 
United States, where a plurality of justices emphasized that the CWA merely 
forbids the addition of pollutants to navigable waters, with no reference to 
directness.97 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit reached an opposite conclusion in two cases handed down after the 
Fourth Circuit’s Upstate Forever II decision, the Fourth Circuit’s position 
aligns with precedent from all other circuits to have ruled on the issue.98 The 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 648 (noting that the need for abatement “continues so 
long as the contaminant continues to flow into navigable waters,” as is the case with the petroleum 
products discharged from Kinder Morgan’s pipeline). 
 95 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (requiring that a discharge come “from” a point source); Up-
state Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652 (finding discharges that reach navigable water by way of hydro-
logically connected groundwater are within the CWA’s scope); Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 
752 (finding a CWA violation when pollutants traveled through groundwater in their movement 
from injection wells—the point source—to the Pacific Ocean—the navigable water); Waterkeeper 
All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 510–11 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that it would be illogical to require 
both the cause of a pollution and intervening land to qualify as a point source); Concerned Area 
Residents for the Env’t, 34 F.3d at 119 (holding that a CWA violation could be found when liquid 
manure passed through fields into navigable waters). 
 96 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (containing no language on the directness of a discharge from 
a point source to navigable waters). 
 97 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006) (finding that the CWA “does not 
forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ but rather 
the ‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters’”); Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 651 (finding 
that a point source discharge may pass through groundwaters before reaching navigable waters). 
The Court in Rapanos noted without disapproval that lower courts had specifically held that un-
permitted discharges that pass-through conveyances rather than directly into navigable waters 
could constitute CWA violations. 547 U.S. at 743; United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 
F. Supp. 945, 946-947 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (rejecting defendant’s argument that a discharge did not 
violate the CWA because it traveled through a municipal treatment system rather than directly 
entering a navigable waterway). 
 98 Compare Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652 (finding discharges that reach navigable 
water by way of hydrologically connected groundwater are within the CWA’s scope), Haw. Wild-
life Fund, 886 F.3d at 752 (finding a CWA violation when pollutants traveled through groundwa-
ter in their movement from injection wells—the point source—to the Pacific Ocean—the naviga-
ble water), and Waterkeeper All., Inc., 399 F.3d at 510–11 (noting that it would be illogical to 
require both the cause of a pollution and intervening land to qualify as a point source), with Ky. 
Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 931, 933 (finding the CWA inapplicable to a coal ash discharge that 
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Fourth Circuit’s ruling is further supported by the EPA’s own interpretation of 
its authority.99 Although the court did not grant Chevron deference to the 
EPA’s interpretation, it did give “respectful consideration” to the EPA’s prior 
use of the hydrological connection theory.100 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision is further bolstered by the CWA’s broad 
purpose and the important policy of holding polluters accountable.101 As the 
court properly noted, the finding of liability for an indirect discharge pre-
vents the opening of an undesirable regulatory loophole that would restrict 
the ability of citizen groups and government agencies to hold polluters ac-
countable.102 Such a loophole would substantively limit the ability of the 
                                                                                                                           
traveled from a holding pond, through groundwater, into a nearby lake), and Tenn. Clean Water 
Network, 905 F.3d at 447 (finding the CWA inapplicable to a coal ash discharge that traveled 
through groundwater to a nearby river). 
 99 See CAFO Standards, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3015 (indicating that the CWA applies to discharges 
“from a point source via ground water that has a direct hydrologic connection to surface water”); 
Amendment to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Res-
ervations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,892 (Dec. 12, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (indi-
cating that NPDES permits are required for discharges to hydrologically connected groundwater). 
But see Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4184 (Feb. 14, 
2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.) (proposing to ex-
clude discharges to wetlands from CWA jurisdiction unless there is a “direct hydrologic surface 
connection” rather than permitting a hydrologic connection that includes groundwater). 
 100 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 651 (finding that the EPA’s analysis of its own author-
ity requires consideration due to the highly technical requirements of the CWA); see also Chev-
ron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (finding that “consider-
able weight” must be given to administrative interpretations of statutes under the administrating 
agency’s purview). The EPA filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs in the Hawai’i Wild-
life Fund litigation arguing that the agency had historically regulated discharges to hydrologically 
connected groundwater under the CWA and that the CWA therefore remained applicable to the 
plaintiff’s allegations. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees at 12, Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d 737 (No. 15-17447), 2016 WL 3098501, at *12. 
 101 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (making it a “national goal” to eliminate all discharges of pollutants 
from navigable waters); William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act 
Been a Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 562 (2004) (noting that the CWA’s pollution permitting 
program is centered on its wide-ranging prohibition on the discharge of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from a point source). Congress also broadly defined a key statutory term—navigable wa-
ters—as “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); see H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131 
(1972) (“The Committee fully intends the term ‘navigable waters’ to be given the broadest possi-
ble constitutional interpretation.”). 
 102 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652 (expressing concern that a finding of no liability 
would undermine the CWA by enabling polluters to evade liability through discharging into the 
ground); Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 767 (determining that a conclusion of no-liability would 
result in the creation of a categorical exemption for wastewater injection wells, contrary to the 
CWA’s language and intent); N. Cal. River Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co., No. C-04-4620 SC, 2005 
WL 2122052, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005) (finding it illogical for the CWA to regulate dis-
charges from a polluter whose pipe runs directly from a factory to a riverbank but not the polluter 
who stores the pollutants in a leaky basin that allows the chemicals to seep into the river). But see 
Patricia Barmeyer, Does Upstate Forever Mean Potential Citizen Suit Liability Forever?, AM. COLL. 
OF ENVTL. LAWYERS BLOG (May 24, 2018), http://www.acoel.org/post/2018/05/24/Does-Upstate-
Forever-Mean-Potential-Citizen-Suit-Liability-Forever.aspx [https://perma.cc/6QW5-J678] (arguing 
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EPA and individual citizens or citizen groups to effectuate the CWA’s pur-
pose of restoring water quality.103 The Sixth Circuit has suggested that other 
environmental statutes such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (“RCRA”) may be better suited to hold parties accountable for certain 
groundwater discharges.104 RCRA, however, is meant to cover the improper 
storage of chemicals, not the release of pollutants into surface water—an 
area clearly under the purview of the CWA.105 Although the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision may result in greater liability for potential polluters, its expansive 
interpretation of the CWA should be welcome.106 More than 30 years have 
passed since the CWA’s stated deadline of ending pollution discharges, and 
water pollution remains a significant problem.107 This decision will there-
fore help move water quality in the right direction.108 
                                                                                                                           
that the potential for citizen-suit liability has significantly increased after the Upstate Forever II 
decision); CWA Liability Expanded to Include Migrating Groundwater Contamination with a 
“Direct Hydrologic Connection” to Jurisdictional Surface Waters, HINSHAW & CULBERTSON 
INFORMING ILL. NEWSL. (July 10, 2018), https://www.hinshawlaw.com/newsroom-newsletters-
309.html [https://perma.cc/7MAQ-8MFC] (arguing that the Upstate Forever II decision signifi-
cantly expanded CWA liability and will result in increased litigation). 
 103 See Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 941 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (contending that the majority opinion has created an exception with no limits that would give 
polluters free rein to add contaminants to navigable waterways, so long as they traveled through 
any medium on their way to the navigable waterway). Specifically, Judge Clay suggests that the 
holding will enable polluters to simply “discharge pollutants from a sprinkler system suspended 
above Lake Michigan” without liability. Id. at 942. 
 104 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2012); see 
Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 937–38 (noting that the discharged coal ash deposits are regulated 
by RCRA and finding the CWA inapplicable). But see Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 945 (Clay, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the CWA and RCRA are not mutually 
exclusive but can both be applicable to an improper discharge). 
 105 See Smith, supra note 3, at 386, 399 (noting that significantly fewer citizen suits are filed 
annually under RCRA than under the CWA). Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (making it a national 
policy to restore the nation’s waters to their natural state through the elimination discharges), with 
42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (making it a national policy to reduce and eliminate the generation of hazard-
ous waste and to improve the storage and disposal of such waste). RCRA regulations exclude 
many materials from the statute’s purview, which may limit the number of suits filed. See 40 
C.F.R. § 261.4 (2018) (listing RCRA exclusions including domestic sewage, pulping liquors, 
certain petroleum-refining materials, among others). 
 106 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652 (finding CWA liability for pollutants that travel 
indirectly from point sources to navigable water through hydrologically connected groundwater). 
 107 Michael Hawthorne, Chicago River Still Teems with Bacteria Flushed from Sewers After 
Storms, CHI. TRIB. (June 23, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
chicago-river-still-dirty-met-20170623-story.html [https://perma.cc/5RK4-94C9] (noting that the 
Chicago River continues to receive liquid waste during storm events); Lynton S. Land, We Can’t 
Improve the Bay’s Water Quality Without Addressing Manure, BAY J. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://
www.bayjournal.com/article/we_cant_improve_the_bays_water_quality_without_addressing_manur
e [https://perma.cc/3PB3-TRTD] (stating that the water quality of the Chesapeake Bay as not made 
significant improvements since the CWA’s enactment); Jack Shea, Action Urged on Sewage Spills 
into Merrimack River, DAILY NEWS OF NEWBURYPORT (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.newburyport
news.com/news/local_news/action-urged-on-sewage-spills-into-merrimack-river/article_a323b9c7-
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CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan 
Energy Partners, L.P. created a broad standard for unpermitted point source 
discharge liability under CWA. The CWA was enacted with the broad pur-
pose of improving and restoring the integrity of the nation’s waters, and the 
court’s decision substantively adhered to this objective. Through its finding 
that the point sources themselves do not need to continue to discharge pol-
lutants, and its determination that liability can be found for pollution dis-
charges that travel through groundwater, the Fourth Circuit avoided the cre-
ation of an unnecessary and unwelcome regulatory loophole. Although the 
court’s ruling will enhance the ability of private individuals, citizen groups, 
and government actors to hold polluters accountable, the reach of these en-
forcement opportunities may be limited, given the Sixth Circuit’s recent 
contradictory holdings and the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari 
in the related Hawai’i Wildlife Fund case. 
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9890-50db-ace6-e4d50efd7abb.html [https://perma.cc/5EAD-EJUK] (discussing ongoing sewage 
spills into the Merrimack River in Massachusetts). 
 108 See Upstate Forever II, 887 F.3d at 652 (holding a pipeline operator liable for spilled pe-
troleum products that made their way through the groundwater and into a navigable waterway). 
